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Abstract
Empirical studies show that most franchise chains use dual distribution - or a plural
form franchise system - characterized by the coexistence of franchised units and company-
owned retail units in the same distribution network. Therefore, this paper focuses on dual
distribution and considers the different contractual arrangements in this type of franchise
system. The paper contributes to the theoretical efforts at developing a model to study
the optimal determination of the share parameters (commission and royalty rates) in a
mixed system.
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1 Introduction
Franchising is one of the most popular business practices. The rise of this type of distribution
network is a global phenomenon that affects numerous countries. Thus, according to the Eu-
ropean Federation of Franchise, franchised brands increased by 20% between 2007 and 2009 in
France, 4% in the UK and 5% in Germany, with major implications in terms of employment.
More specifically, Germany had 980 established franchise networks with 65500 franchisees,
representing e55 billion Euros in turnover, which generated 463 000 jobs in 2010. Furthermore,
in 2010 the United Kingdom had 842 franchisors and 34800 franchisees, which represented
e15.20 billion Euros in turnover and generated 462000 jobs. Lastly, France had 1569 franchisors
and 62041 franchisees producing e49.24 billion Euros in turnover that generated 310265 jobs
in 2011 (French Franchising Federation, 2012).
Moreover, between 2011 and 2012, the US franchised sector employed approximately 18
million people, in turn generating an economic output of over 2.1 trillion, equal to approximately
40.9% of the retailing sector, and contributed 4.8% of GDP growth, 5% to sales growth and
2.1% to employment growth (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011).
Between 2009 and 2010, the Brazilian franchised sector increased sales by 20%, employment
by 7.9% and the number of networks by 12.9% (Brazilian Franchise Association, 2010). Ac-
cording to the U.S. Commercial Service, Venezuela ranks third in Latin America with respect
to franchising, after Brazil and Mexico. Annual growth in franchising growth is estimated to be
25% (number of outlets) and the sector’s contribution to non-petroleum GDP is estimated to
be 2.2% in 2007, with an increase to 2.9% in 2011 (Front Consulting Group and Ca´mara Vene-
zolana de Franquicias-Profranquicias, 2011). Franchising in Mexico, however, grew by 14% in
2008, when the World Franchise Council ranked Mexico as the 7th leading nation in franchise
development (The U.S. Commercial Service (2009)). In addition, franchising in Mexico grew
13% in 2011; Mexico has 1013 franchises, turnover is nearly 85 billion Mexican pesos annually,
which is represents 500000 jobs (Mexican Association of Franchises (2012)).
Therefore, franchise networks are very dynamic and present worldwide, and this study
should, therefore, receive particular attention from researchers.
The economic analysis in this paper, based on the theoretical foundations of Rey and Ti-
role (1986), analyzes franchises as a contractual innovation that faces informational problems,
externalities and coordination problems (vertical and horizontal). Economic theory focuses on
the characteristics of contractual agreements (vertical restrictions) between producers and re-
tailers (duration of contracts, royalty rates, territorial exclusivity, contributions to investments,
etc.), the aim being to explain their presence in real economic contracts and provide normative
approach to determine the optimal contractual structure to yield greater efficiency.
The theories of industrial organization are used to understand this phenomenon. Thus,
the studies employing the agency theory framework focus on the problems associated with
providing the proper incentives to elicit effort in the franchise relationship (Va´zquez, 2005).
Studies employing the perspective of transaction costs theory analyze franchises as a hybrid
form between vertical integration and conventional contracts, showing that it is effective in the
presence of specific assets, such as a common brand name throughout the network (Lafontaine
and Slade, 2010).
While economists focus on contractual terms, management science researchers are often
interested in the organizational designs of the networks.
Given the success of certain organizational forms in distribution networks, particularly in
franchising, management science researchers, especially marketing researchers, expressed early
interest in the subject. Franchise was then considered to be a temporary organizational form,
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making it possible to relax financial and human constraints because the franchisee is an investor
and an entrepreneur. Early versions of “scarcity theory” were developed by Hunt (1973) and
Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1968).
The focus of franchise studies then turned to the study of mixed networks where franchised
units and company-owned retail units coexist. Thus, “tapered integration theory” (Harrigan,
1984) supports the notion of mixing in networks, and Bradach (1997), in his exploratory study,
highlights the synergies between franchised units and owned units. Lastly, contributions em-
ploying property rights theory included the shared decision rights between the franchisor and
franchisee and how they related to individual knowledge (Dant and Windsperger, 2006).
The empirical literature on franchising emphasizes the relevance of contract theory to un-
derstanding this major phenomenon. The relationships between franchisors and franchisees are
characterized by information asymmetries, and the mechanisms included in franchise contracts
can be understood as a means of addressing these asymmetries.
A survey of the literature1 in the fields of economics and management shows that 124 papers
were devoted to franchising over the period 2000-2012; 99 of which were empirical papers. From
this empirical literature on franchising, two major theoretical frameworks emerge: theories of
contracts and resource scarcity theory, as shown in Table 1.
Theoretical framework Number of related Theoretical framework Number of related
articles articles
Theories of contracts 48 Theory of incentives 40
Resource Scarcity Theory 21 Transaction Costs Theory 7
Other 22 Signaling Theory 1
Not mentioned 8
Total number of 99 Total number of 48
empirical papers empirical papers
on franchising* on franchising in
the contract theory
Table 1: Theoretical frameworks in the literature on franchise data.
*From a survey of 23 top ranked reviews in Economics and Management over the period 2000-2012.
In this literature, only 19 papers were theoretical studies concerning private information
(Hempelmann B., 2005), dual distribution (Bai C. and Tao Z., 2000) or territorial exclusivity
(Nair S., Tikoo S. and Liu S., 2009). Here again, agency theory is the main framework (7
papers), followed by the game theory (5 papers).
In summary, in recent decades, agency-theoretic explanations in terms of moral-hazards,
incentive problems and monitoring costs were the dominant direction in empirical franchising
research (e.g., Alon, 2000; Lafontaine and Shaw, 2005; Castrogiovanni et al., 2006; Pe´nard
et al., 2011). Thus, agency theory appears to have been the most widely applied theory to
explain franchising. However, theoretical analysis employing the agency framework remain
limited, with only 7 theoretical papers over the last twelve years (Bai and Tao, 2000; Lewis,
2002; Hemplemann, 2006; Tracey and Jarvis, 2007; Etro, 2011; Hendrikse, 2011; Chirico et al.,
2011).
1This survey considers the 22 top ranked reviews journals in Economics and Management over the past twelve
years. The journals considered here are presented in alphabetical order: Academy of Management Journal,
American Economic Review, Applied Economics, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, European Economic
Review, European Management Review, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Journal of Business
Venturing, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Journal of
Industrial Economics, Journal of Law and Economics, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Journal
of Marketing, Journal of Marketing Channels, Journal of Marketing Research, Journal of Retailing, Journal
of Small Business Management, Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Marketing Science, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, RAND Journal of Economics, Review of Industrial Organization.
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Using the framework of agency theory, the aim of this paper is to study monetary clauses
(the royalty rate and commission rate) as incentive devices in mixed distribution networks, in
other words, in franchising networks using dual distribution.
Dual distribution is common in franchise systems worldwide. Thus, in Brazil, France,
US and Venezuela, over 65% of franchise networks employ dual distribution (see Table 2).
Therefore, studying this phenomenon appears crucial to better understand franchising.
Country* Number of Only Franchised Only Owned Dual
Networks Units Units Distribution
Brazil 202 17% 6% 77%
(2012)
France 307 30% 5% 65%
(2007)
Venezuela 217 13% 20% 67%
(2012)
Unites States 94 16% 10% 74%
(2012)
Table 2: Dual Distribution.
From: Brazilian Franchise Association (2012), INSEE (2007), Front Consulting Group and Ca´mara Venezolana de Franquicias-
Profranquicias (2012) and Bond’s guide (2012).
*These data are unavailable for Mexico
Before proceeding with the analysis, the theoretical literature on dual distribution should
be reviewed. Gallini, N. and Lutz, N. (1992) developed a seminal model of signaling, formally
demonstrating that the ”good type” of franchisors can signal their type and therefore provide
relevant information to the future franchisees. The signaling devices take organizational and
contractual forms that make the franchisor’s revenue highly dependent on the profitability of
the business concept.
In addition, Bai and Tao (2000) use the agency framework to study dual distribution by
adapting the Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) multitasking model. These authors emphasize
the complementarities between company-owned units and independent retailers coexisting in
the same network. In dual distribution, each type of downstream unit is devoted to a specific
task; owned units are more involved in the promotion of the common brand, while franchised
units are more involved in sales efforts.
Moreover, using a risk-theoretic model, Bu¨rkle, T. and Posselt, T. (2008) study a plural form
franchise system to explain the proportion of franchisees relative to the company-owned outlets
in the chain. They show that the incentive to franchise decreases as the share of franchisee-
owned selling units increases, as well as with decreasing control costs. In addition, Hendrikse
and Jiang (2011) find that the efficiency of dual distribution as a governance mechanism does
not depend on heterogeneous downstream outlets.
Second, two theoretical papers, using the agency theory framework, address the determina-
tion of royalty rates in pure franchise systems. Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995) highlight
the double-sided moral hazard in the franchise relationship and determine the optimal royalty
rate in a linear contract, finding that the optimal share parameter will be independent of the
scale of operations and the cost of effort for the two parties to the contract. Subsequently,
Brickley J. (2002) employs a theoretical and an empirical model to study the effects of termi-
nation laws in franchise contracts, providing evidence regarding the determinants of royalties
and upfront fees in share contracts.
The aim of this paper is to combine these two strands of the literature. This study proceeds
as follows: Section 2 presents a theoretical agency model of monetary provision in the case of
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dual distribution. The franchisor is studied as the principal of a distribution chain with two
agents: a franchisee and the manager of a company-owned retail unit. A general description of
the model is provided, and three distinct cases regarding the informational context are studied.
Section 3 discusses the results and presents seven propositions. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
This model considers plural form franchising systems, where company-owned downstream units
coexist with franchised outlets. As mentioned above, most franchise networks combine the two
types of downstream units (see Table 2).
The aim of this moral-hazard model is to define the contractual design, more precisely the
monetary terms, while maximizing the franchisor’s profit, under the assumption that there are
two different types of agents: a franchisee and the manager of a company-owned outlet.
The model is based on prior studies in the theoretical literature on franchising: Bhat-
tacharyya S. and Lafontaine F. (1995), Lafontaine F. and Slade M. (1998), Lafontaine F. and
Blair R. (2005), Bu¨rkle T. and Posselt T. (2008), Milgrom P. and Roberts J. (1992), Bai, C.
and Tao, Z. (2000).
Because plural form networks combine two types of agents (the downstream outlets), the
principal (the franchisor) cannot employ a single strategy for the two different types of agents.
The franchisees are rewarded with downstream profits, while the managers of company-owned
units are compensated with wages (see Figure 1).
On the one hand, the standard principal-agent model introduces the notion of risk-aversion,
i.e., the agent or the principal “values income levels that he knows he will obtain with certainty
above the same income level obtained in expectation only” (Lafontaine 2005 pg.109). This
formulation of expected utility is known as a Von Neumann-Morgenstern type function.
First, for simplicity, we assume that the network has only one franchisee and one manager.
Assuming that the manager is only rewarded with a fixed wage, he will not necessarily be
encouraged to exert his maximal effort. We therefore assume that manager compensation
contains a fixed component (the wage) and a variable component that depends on the sales of
the company-owned unit (commission rate). Second, we assume that an inverse relationship
exists between the upfront fee and royalty rate. That is, this relationship depends on franchisor
risk aversion; if he is less risk averse, he will prefer the up-front fee. Third, we assume that the
franchisor, the manager and the franchisee are risk averse. Fourth, to simplify the analysis, we
assume that the product price is exogenously given. However, the contracting parties influence
demand in a sales area via their effort.
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Figure 1: Overview of the model
In summary, we assume that:
Assumption 2.1. The network contains a franchised-unit and a company owned-unit.
Assumption 2.2. The franchisee is remunerated with the profits from his own unit.
Assumption 2.3. Manager compensation is composed of a fixed component (w) and a commi-
ssion (y) that varies depending on his sales in the downstream market.
Assumption 2.4. The franchisor obtains revenue from each downstream unit.
Assumption 2.5. The franchisor’s effort is applied is to promote the network.
Assumption 2.6. An inverse relationship exists between the up-front fee and the royalty rate.
Assumption 2.7. The franchisor, the franchisee and the manager are risk averse.
Assumption 2.8. The cost of effort is the only operating cost in the franchise network.
Assumption 2.9. The franchised-unit and the company-owned unit are local monopolies, i.e.
franchisee has a territorial exclusivity.
Assumption 2.10. The contracting parties do not influence demand though the price of
good (l) (Hemplemann, B. (2006)).
2.1 General Description
In contract theory, the utility function for an agent with constant risk aversion (CARA) is
frequently defined as: u(I) = −exp(−ρI), where I represents income and ρ is the coefficient of
absolute risk aversion; in this type of utility function, the agent behaves as if he is maximizing
his certainty-equivalent income, CE, defined as:
CE = E(I)−R (2.1)
The certainty-equivalent income is the quantity that remains once the risk premium is paid.
Let E(I) denote the income expectation operator and R risk aversion. Thus, the expected
profit for the franchisor, the franchisee and the manager are, respectively2.
2The subscripts ρ , f and m refer to the franchisor, franchisee and manager, respectively.
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E(Ip) = rh(ef , ep)l + (1− y)h(em, ep)l + F − C(ep)− w (2.2)
E(If ) = (1− r)h(ef , ep)l − F − C(ef ) (2.3)
E(Im) = w + yh(em, ep)l + C(em) (2.4)
where,
r = royalty rate
e. = effort
h(ef , ep) = final demand to the franchised-unit
l = price of good
y = commission rate paid by the franchisor to the manager
F = up-front fee
C(e.) = cost of effort
w = manager’s wage
h(em, ep) = final demand to the company-owned unit
We assume that the two agents (franchisee, manager) and the principal are CARA, and
hence the risk premium is defined by the following:
R =
ρ
2
V ar(I) (2.5)
The risk premium associated with the random income is the amount that an individual is
willing3 to pay in order to make the switch between an income and a random income with
an expect. In others words, it is the difference between the expected payoff and the certainty
equivalent, where ρ is the coefficient of aversion and V ar(I) refers to the variance. Thus, the
risk premium for the franchisor, manager and franchisee are defined as follows:
Rp =
ρp
2
V ar(rθf + (1− y)θm) (2.6)
Rf =
ρf
2
V ar((1− r)θf ) (2.7)
Rm =
ρm
2
V ar(yθm) (2.8)
The risk premium accounts the coefficient of risk aversion ρ and the variation in income.
That is, the risk premium associated with the franchisee is the percentage of revenues he receives
(1 − r), and the variance in sales (θf ), or the state of nature. The manager’s risk premium
captures the percentage of revenues he receives (y) and the variance in sales (θm), or the state
of nature. Lastly, the franchisor’s risk premium (r, (1 − y)) uses the two percentages that he
receives and the variance in sales, or the state of nature.
Using equations (2.2, 2.3 and 2.2) and (2.6, 2.7 and 2.8), we can rewrite the certainty
equivalents of the two agents and the principal as:
3The theoretical risk premium would be the lowest likelihood payoff paying a price for the risk and would
be based on the calculation of probabilities of the outcomes in question.
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CEp = rh(ef , ep)l + (1− y)h(emf, ep)l + F − C(ep)− w
−ρp
2
(V ar(rθf ) + V ar(1− y)θm + 2Cov(r, (1− y)) (2.9)
First, the franchisor’s certainty equivalent CEp is divided into three components. The first
is the income provided by the franchisee (rh(ef , ep)l+F ), while the second is that provided by
the manager ((1−y)h(emf, ep)l). Note that each of these two components depends on the effort
of the franchisee h(ef , ep), the manager h(em, ep) and the franchisor. The third component is
the cost that the franchisor must pay. This cost refers to: the cost of his own effort C(ep), the
wage paid to the manager (w + yh(em, ep)l) and the risk premium.
CEf = (1− r)h(ef , ep)l − F − C(ef )− ρf
2
(1− r)2θ2f (2.10)
Second, the franchisee’s certainty equivalent CEf is defined as his income when royalties
(r) are paid to the franchisor, minus the up-front fee F , the cost of his effort C(ef ) and the
risk premium.
CEm = w + yh(em, ep)l − C(em)− ρm
2
y2θ2m (2.11)
Lastly, the manager’s certainty equivalent CEm is his wage plus commission (y) over sales
minus the cost of his effort C(em) and the risk premium.
We assume that the demand function satisfies4:
Assumption 2.11. dh/dem(em, ep) > 0, dh/def (ef , ep) > 0, dh/dep(ep, e) > 0,
d2h/de2f (ef , ep) < 0, d
2h/de2p(ef , ep) < 0, d
2h/de2m(em, ep) < 0
The demand function exhibits positive but decreasing or increasing returns to effort.
Assumption 2.12. d2h/defdep(ef , ep) = 0, d
2h/depdem(ep, em) = 0
The parties influence demand independently.
Assumption 2.13. limef→0 dh/def (ep, ef ) =∞, limep→0 dh/dep(ep, ef ) =∞,
limem→0 dh/def (ep, em) =∞, limep→0 dh/def (ep, em) =∞
Assumption 2.14. limef→∞ dh/def (ep, ef ) = 0, limep→∞ dh/dep(ep, ef ) = 0,
limem→∞ dh/def (ep, em) = 0, limep→∞ dh/def (ep, em) = 0
Asumption (2.13) and (2.13) exclude the optimality of no or infinite effort expenditures.
We also assume for simplicity that income lh(.) is equal to total sales in each network. Thus,
suppose that a franchisee or a manager must exert effort to generate sales in his outlet, the
downstream sales S5 will be given by the following:
S = αe+ ε ∼ N(0, θ2) (2.12)
4For additional information regarding this assumption, see Hemplemann, B. (2006)
5For further information regarding this expression, see Lafontaine F. and Blair R. (2005)
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where e is the manager’s effort, α measures the importance of this effort in the sales gen-
eration process and ε is a random variable with mean 0 and variance θ2, which precludes the
franchisor from inferring e from observed S. When the franchisor and manager, or the fran-
chisee and franchisor, must provide a given level of effort e, this effort level is unobservable.
This means that the franchisor cannot observe the franchisee’s or the manager’s effort, and
the franchisor’s advertising effort cannot be observed by the agents. Therefore, the optimal
contract will involve revenue sharing. Thus, the franchisee’s sales and the manager’s sales will
be given by the following:
Sf = αef +
δep
2
+ εf ∼ N(0, θ2f ) (2.13)
The income generated by the franchised-unit is the sum of the franchisee’s effort ef , the
importance of this effort α, the franchisor’s effort ep and his importance δ in the sales process.
Sm = βem +
δep
2
+ εm ∼ N(0, θ2m) (2.14)
In this sense, the income generated by the owned-unit is the sum of franchisee effort em, the
importance of this effort β, the franchisor’s effort ep and his importance δ in the sales process.
The franchisor’s effort has identical effects on the franchisee’s sales and the manager’s sales.
For this reason, we divide the principal’s cost of effort so as not to duplicate the principal’s
effort ep.
We assume that the cost of effort is constant and quadratic, as is frequently defined in the
literature6:
C(e) =
e2
2
= C(ef ) = C(em) = C(ep) (2.15)
We assume also that there are no other costs associated with operating this business. Using
equations (2.6), (2.7), (2.8), (2.13), (2.14) and (2.15), it is possible to rewrite the certainty
equivalents for the principal and agents as follows:
CEp = r(αef +
δep
2
) + (1− y)(βem + δep
2
) + F − e
2
p
2
− w
−ρp
2
(r2θ2f + (1− y)2θ2m + 2Cov(θfr, θm(1− y)) (2.16)
CEm = w + y(βem +
δep
2
)− e
2
m
2
− ρm
2
y2θ2m (2.17)
CEf = (1− r)(αef + δep
2
)− F − e
2
f
2
− ρf
2
(1− r)2θ2f (2.18)
2.2 The Franchisor’s Problem
In franchise systems, the franchisor is typically responsible for promoting and advertising the
chain. The franchisee and manager, however, are responsible for managing the outlets on a day-
to-day basis. The agents’ and franchisor’s efforts affect the performance of the outlet. However,
6Lafontaine F. and Blair R., 2005; Lafontaine F. and Slade M., 1998; Milgrom P. and Roberts J., 1992.
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the intensity of the effort devoted to such activities is not easily monitored (Bhattacharyya
S. and Lafontaine F., 1995). Therefore, the principal’s problem can be formalized with the
following maximization problem:
Max[r,y,F,w,ef ,em,ep]CEp = r(αef +
δep
2
) + (1− y)(βem + δep
2
) + F − e
2
p
2
− w
−ρp
2
(r2θ2f + (1− y)2θ2m + 2Cov(θfr, θm(1− y)) (2.19)
s.t.
i. CEm = w + y(βem +
δep
2 )− e
2
m
2 − ρm2 y2θ2m ≥ U
ii. CEf = (1− r)(αef + δep2 )− F −
e2f
2 −
ρf
2 (1− r)2θ2f ≥ K
iii.
dCEp
ep
= r δ2 + (1− y) δ2 − ep = 0
iv.
dCEf
ef
= (1− r)α− ef = 0
v. dCEmem = yβ − em = 0
Provided that restrictions (i) and (ii) are satisfied, the manager and franchisee accept the
contract. These conditions are known as the participation constraints. Furthermore, the funda-
mental point of the moral hazard problem is that the principal (and agents) cannot observe the
efforts of other actors. Using the first-order approach, the agents (and principal) will select a
the level of effort that maximizes his objective function (CE(p,m,f)). These conditions are known
as the incentive constraints ((iii), (iv) and (v) in the franchisor’s maximization problem).
2.3 Case 1: Symmetric information and no relationship between
the rates
We first present the case where the franchisor knows the effort supplied by the agents and
the agents know the effort of the franchisor. In this situation, the agents and the principal
operate under symmetric information. We assume that the agents and the franchisor are risk
averse. Therefore, the franchisor’s maximization problem only considers restrictions (i) and
(ii). In addition, we assume that the commission rate and the royalty rate are independent.
This means that there is no relationship between the two rates; the covariance is 0.
Consequently, the Lagrangian problem is given by the following:
ι = r(αef +
δep
2
) + (1− y)(βem + δep
2
) + F − e
2
p
2
− w
−ρp
2
(r2θ2f + (1− y)2θ2m)
−λ1(U + e
2
m
2
+
ρm
2
y2θ2m − w − y(βem +
δep
2
))
−λ2(K + F +
e2f
2
+
ρf
2
(1− r)2θ2f − (1− r)(αef +
δep
2
)) (2.20)
Solving this problem7, the royalty rate is defined by the following:
7See Appendix 2 for details
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r∗ =
ρfθ
2
f
ρpθ2f + ρfθ
2
f
(2.21)
The commission rate is the following:
y∗ =
ρpθ
2
m
ρpθ2m + ρmθ
2
m
(2.22)
Under symmetric information, the coefficient of risk aversion is the only factor that deter-
mines the royalty and commission rates.
2.4 Case 2: Asymmetric information and no relationship between
the rates
We study now the case where the efforts of the agents and principal are unknown. In this
situation, the agents and the principal operate under asymmetric information. We assume that
the two agents and the franchisor are risk averse. In this case, the franchisor’s maximization
program considers the four constraints described above. In addition, we assume that the com-
mission and the royalty rates are independent; the covariance is 0.
Consequently, the Lagrangian problem is given by the following:
ι = r(αef +
δep
2
) + (1− y)(βem + δep
2
) + F − e
2
p
2
− w − ρp
2
(r2θ2f + (1− y)2θ2m)
−λ1(U + e
2
m
2
+
ρm
2
y2θ2m − w − y(βem +
δep
2
))
−λ2(K + F +
e2f
2
+
ρf
2
(1− r)2θ2f − (1− r)(αef +
δep
2
))
−λ3(ep − r δ
2
− (1− y)δ
2
)− λ4(ef − (1− r)α)− λ5(em − yβ) (2.23)
Solving this problem8, the royalty rate is defined as the following:
r∗ =
4ρfθ
2
f + δ
2y + δ2
4ρpθ2f + 4ρfθ
2
f + 4α
2 + δ2
(2.24)
The commission rate is the following:
y∗ =
4ρpθ
2
m + rδ
2 − δ2 + 4β2
4ρpθ2m + 4ρmθ
2
m + δ
2 + 4β2
(2.25)
Under asymmetric information, in addition to the coefficient of risk aversion, the importance
of effort in the downstream sales of each agent determines the royalty and commission rates.
Note that the royalty rate is also determined by the commission rate and vice versa, despite
the assumption that they are independent.
8See Appendix 3 for details
11
2.5 Case 3: Asymmetric information and the relationship between
the rates
In addition to asymmetric information, we assume now that there is a relationship between the
two rates. The covariance9 can be re-written as follows:
Cov((θm(1− y)), (θfr)) = θfθmr(1− y) (2.26)
We substitute equation (2.26) into (2.19), and the Lagrangian problem is given by the
following:
ι = r(αef +
δep
2
) + (1− y)(βem + δep
2
) + F − e
2
p
2
− w
−ρp
2
(r2θ2f + (1− y)2θ2m + 2θfθmr(1− y))
−λ1(U + e
2
m
2
+
ρm
2
y2θ2m − w − y(βem +
δep
2
))
−λ2(K + F +
e2f
2
+
ρf
2
(1− r)2θ2f − (1− r)(αef +
δep
2
))
−λ3(ep − r δ
2
− (1− y)δ
2
)− λ4(ef − (1− r)α)− λ5(em − yβ) (2.27)
Solving this problem10, the royalty rate is defined as the following:
r∗ =
4ρfθ
2
f + δ
2y + δ2 − 4ρpθfθm + 4ρpθfθmy
4ρpθ2f + 4ρfθ
2
f + 4α
2 + δ2
(2.28)
The commission rate is the following:
y∗ =
4ρpθ
2
m + 4ρpθfθmr + rδ
2 − δ2 + 4β2
4ρpθ2m + 4ρmθ
2
m + δ
2 + 4β2
(2.29)
Under asymmetric information, the royalty rate, the commission rate, the risk aversion coef-
ficient, and the importance of effort in downstream sales determine the royalty and commission
rates. However, the royalty rate cannot be determined from equation (2.29) and the commission
rate cannot be determined from equation (2.28), as this would result in sub-optimal solutions.
Therefore, irrespective of the inclusion of the independence of rates assumption, the factors
that determine them remain unchanged.
3 Results
The results remain nearly identical irrespective of whether we assume symmetric or asymmetric
information (where the rates are independent or dependent). The risk aversion coefficients and
the importance of effort in downstream sales determine the optimal royalty and commission
rates. In addition, the commission rate is also a parameter in determining the optimal royalty
and vice-versa (see Table 3).
9See Appendix 4 for details
10See Appendix 5 for details
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Variable* Symmetric Asymmetric Information
Information Independent Not independent
Rates Rates
ρf ↑ r ↑ r ↑ r ↑
ρp ↑ r ↓ r ↓ r ↓
ρm ↑ y ↓ y ↓ y ↓
ρp ↑ y ↑ y ↑ y ↑
δ ↑ r ↑ r ↑
δ ↑ y ↓ y ↓
α ↑ r ↓ r ↓
β ↑ y ↑ y ↑
r ↑ y ↑⇔ (1− y) ↓
Table 3: Summary of the results
*When the variable increases and the other factors remain constant
The following propositions result from the model:
Proposition 3.1. When the franchisee’s risk aversion increases, the royalty rate increases.
Proposition 3.2. When the manager’s risk aversion increases, the commission rate falls.
Proposition 3.3. When the franchisor’s risk aversion increases, the commission rate increases
and the royalty rate falls.
The royalty and commission rates act as insurance devices for the agents and principal.
Suppose that the franchisor’s risk aversion increases. In this situation, the franchisor prefers a
safer device to extract the surplus of the franchised unit. Therefore, the franchisor prefers a
higher up-front fee rather than a higher royalty rate, as the second device depends on sales.
In addition, to extract income from the owned-unit, the franchisor would prefer to pay a
low wage (low constant component and high commission) with a higher commission rate rather
than a fixed wage, to force the manager take on the risk.
Now suppose that the franchisee’s risk aversion increases. To obtain an insurance mecha-
nism, the franchisee prefers to pay a higher royalty rate and a low up-front fee, as this is a way
to share the sales risk with the franchisor. Furthermore, when the manager’s risk aversion’s
increases, he will prefer to be compensated with a higher fixed wage and lower commission, as
the final wage would depend little on the sales in the downstream market.
Proposition 3.4. When the importance of the franchisee’s effort in downstream sales increases,
the royalty rate falls.
Proposition 3.5. When the importance of the manager’s effort in downstream sales increases,
the commission rate increases.
Proposition 3.6. When the importance of the principal’s effort in downstream sales increases,
the commission rate falls and the royalty rate increases.
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Those propositions allow us to return to the incentive conditions. Thus, suppose that the
manager is friendlier to customers, which could generate more sales; in other words, the effect
of the manager’s effort on downstream sales β increases, and hence principal should incentivize
him through an increase in salary (commission rate). The same is true for the franchisee, except
that he will be incentivized through a reduction in the royalty rate (share parameter). Now
suppose that the franchisor’s advertising effort is more effective in attracting customers, which
would result in increased sales. In this case, franchisor would attempt to receive the most
compensation, which is why the royalty rate increases and the commission rate decreases.
Proposition 3.7. There is an inverse relationship between the commission and royalty rates
(r, (1− y)).
When the franchisor sets the royalty rate at the optimal level, which is in part determined
by the commission rate, there is a direct relationship between the two rates. That is, there
is an inverse relationship between the commission rate that the franchisor receives from the
owned-unit and the royalty rate he receives from the franchised unit.
A similar result is obtained when the franchisor sets the commission rate at the optimal level,
which is in part determined by the royalty rate. If the optimal y∗ is substituted into r∗, the
commission rate will also depend on the importance of the franchisee’s effort and vice-versa.
Thus, a relationship exists between the two rates, as they are related to the same network. This
result suggests that the units are complementary, which is consistent with Bai and Tao (2000).
4 Conclusion
Several theoretical economic models explain the existence of plural form distribution networks,
and several models address the determination of the monetary provisions in the franchise con-
tracts.
However, the previous literature failed to address the determination of the monetary con-
tractual terms in a plural form system.
Our model provides an approach based on the agency theory, which accounts for risk aversion
and incentive issues, to understand the mechanisms related to the determination of the royalty
and commission rates in a mixed distribution chain.
The paper demonstrates that: when the franchisee’s risk aversion increases, the royalty
rate increases; when the manager’s risk aversion increases, the commission rate falls; when the
franchisor’s risk aversion increases, the commission rate increases and the royalty rate falls;
when the importance of the franchisee’s effort in determining downstream sales increases, the
royalty rate falls; when the importance of the manager’s effort in determining downstream
sales increases, the commission rate increases; when the importance of the principal’s effort in
determining downstream sales increases, the commission rate falls and the royalty rate increases;
there is an inverse relationship between the rates set by the franchisor.
Even if our model improves the theoretical understanding of the determination of the mon-
etary contractual terms in a plural form system, we think that numerous improvements could
be included, since we first assume that each outlet faces the same environmental uncertainty.
Second, we assume that the principal and each agent are characterized by constant risk aver-
sion, which is identical for all actors. However, we know that each agent has a different level of
risk aversion, for instance a franchisee would be less risk averse than a manager who receives a
fixed wage each month, as the franchisee’ income will depend on sales. That is, in the franchise
system it is more risky to be a franchisee than a manager. Further theoretical research could
14
address these problems and thereby provide further insights. In addition, our aim is test the
predictions of the model using an econometric analysis of actual data. This would allow us to
evaluate the effect of the risk aversion on the monetary clauses in franchise contracts.
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Appendix 1: Nomenclature
CEp Certainty equivalent of the franchisor
CEm Certainty equivalent of the manager
CEf Certainty equivalent of the franchisee
Ip Franchisor’s income
Im Manager’s income
If Franchisee’s income
ε The profit function does not depend on
the agent’s effort or the state of nature. This latter is
not controlled by the agent.
h(.) Demand function
S Sales
l Price of good
Rf Franchisee’s risk aversion
Rp Franchisor’s risk aversion
Rm Manager’s risk aversion
F Up-front fee
αf Franchisee’s risk aversion coefficient
αp Franchisor’s risk aversion coefficient
αm Manager’s risk aversion coefficient
r Royalty rate
y Commission rate
ef Franchisee’s effort
ep Franchisor’s effort
em Manager’s effort
C(e) Effort in sales process
θ2y,r Variance in income due to the state of nature in
the franchised unit
δ Effect of the franchisor’s effort on downstream sales
W Manager’s wage
U Manager’s reservation utility
K Franchisor’s reservation utility
λ1,2 Multiplier for the participation constraint
λ3,4,5 Multiplier for the incentive compatibility constraint
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Appendix 2: Case 1
The first-order conditions for the optimization11 are given by the following:
1. Lagrangian with respect to the wages:
λ1 = 1 (4.1)
2. Lagrangian with respect to the up-front fee:
λ2 = 1 (4.2)
3. Lagrangian with respect to λ1,2:
w + y(βem +
δep
2
)− e
2
m
2
− ρm
2
y2θ2m = U (4.3)
(1− r)(αef + δep
2
)− F − e
2
f
2
− ρf
2
(1− r)2θ2f = K (4.4)
“Hence the franchisee’s and manager’s individual-rationality constraint must be binding.
This implies that there are no rents left downstream” (Bhattacharyya S. and Lafontaine F.
(1995)).
4. The Lagrangian with respect to the principal’s effort indicates that:
r
δ
2
+ (1− y)δ
2
− ep − λ1(−y δ
2
)− λ2(−(1− r)δ
2
) = 0 (4.5)
Substituting equations (4.1) and (4.2) into (4.5), we have:
r
δ
2
+
δ
2
− y δ
2
− ep + y δ
2
+
δ
2
− δ
2
r = 0 (4.6)
δ = ep (4.7)
This expression indicates that the principal’s effort is equal to effect of the franchisor’s effort
on downstream sales, as we are operating under symmetric information.
5. The Lagrangian with respect to the manager’s effort indicates that:
β − yβ − λ1(em − yβ) = 0 (4.8)
Substituting equation (4.2) into (4.8), we have:
β − yβ − em + yβ = 0 (4.9)
em = β (4.10)
Similarly, the manager’s effort is equal to his influence on downstream sales.
6. The Lagrangian with respect to the franchisee’s effort indicates that:
11We assume that is sufficiently concave and that are sufficiently convex to ensure that the second-order
conditions hold (Bhattacharyya S. and Lafontaine F., 1995).
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rα− λ2(ef − α + rα) = 0 (4.11)
Substituting equation (4.2) into (4.11), we have:
rα− ef − rα + α = 0 (4.12)
ef = α (4.13)
Similarly, the franchisee’s effort is equal to his influence on downstream sales.
7. The Lagrangian with respect to the royalty rate indicates that:
αef +
δep
2
− ρpθ2fr − λ2(−ρfθ2f + ρfθ2fr + αef +
δep
2
) (4.14)
Substituting equation (4.2) into (4.14), we have12:
−ρpθ2fr + ρfθ2f − ρfθ2fr (4.15)
r∗ =
ρfθ
2
f
ρpθ2f + ρfθ
2
f
(4.16)
Variable* SymmetricInformation
ρf ↑ r ↑
ρp ↑ r ↓
8. The Lagrangian with respect to the commission rate indicates that:
−βem − δep
2
+ ρpθ
2
m − ρpθ2my − λ1(ρmθ2my − βem −
δep
2
) = 0 (4.17)
Substituting equation (4.1) into (4.17), we have13:
ρpθ
2
m − ρpθ2my − ρmθ2my = 0 (4.18)
y∗ =
ρpθ
2
m
ρpθ2m + ρmθ
2
m
(4.19)
Variable* SymmetricInformation
ρm ↑ y ↓
ρp ↑ y ↑
12The set of restrictions is convex, suggesting a maximum, which is verified using Matlab software.
13The set of restrictions is convex, suggesting a maximum, which is verified using Matlab software.
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Appendix 3: Case 2
The first-order conditions for the optimization14 are given by the following:
1. Lagrangian with respect to the wages:
λ1 = 1 (4.20)
2. Lagrangian with respect to the up-front fee:
λ2 = 1 (4.21)
3. Lagrangian with respect to λ1,2,3,4,5:
w + y(βem +
δep
2
)− e
2
m
2
− ρm
2
y2θ2m = U (4.22)
(1− r)(αef + δep
2
)− F − e
2
f
2
− ρf
2
(1− r)2θ2f = K (4.23)
“Hence the franchisee’s and manager’s individual-rationality constraint must be binding.
This implies that there are no rents left downstream” (Bhattacharyya S. and Lafontaine F.
(1995)).
(r + (1− y))δep
2
= ep (4.24)
(1− r)α = ef (4.25)
yβ = em (4.26)
The effort provided by each agent and principal is equal to their incentives and the impor-
tance of their effort in determining downstream sales.
4. The Lagrangian with respect to the principal’s effort indicates that:
r
δ
2
+ (1− y)δ
2
− ep − λ1(−y δ
2
)− λ2(−(1− r)δ
2
)λ3 = 0 (4.27)
Substituting equations (4.20) and (4.21) and (iii) into (4.27), we have:
λ3 =
δ
2
(y − r + 1) (4.28)
We know that commission and royalty rates are less than 1, and hence we can conclude that
λ3 is positive.
5. The Lagrangian with respect to the manager’s effort indicates that:
β − yβ − λ1(em − yβ)− λ5 = 0 (4.29)
14We assume that is sufficiently concave and that are sufficiently convex to ensure that the second-order
conditions hold (Bhattacharyya S. and Lafontaine F., 1995).
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Substituting equation (4.20) into (4.29), we have:
λ5 = β(1− y) (4.30)
λ5 is positive because the commission rate is less than 1.
6. The Lagrangian with respect to the franchisee’s effort indicates that:
rα− λ2(ef − (1− r)α)− λ4 = 0 (4.31)
Substituting equation (4.21) and (iv) into (4.31), we have:
λ4 = rα (4.32)
λ4 is also positive.
7. The Lagrangian with respect to the royalty rate indicates that:
αef +
δep
2
− ρpθ2fr − λ2(−ρfθ2f + ρfθ2fr + αef +
δep
2
) + λ3
δep
2
− λ4α (4.33)
Substituting equation (4.21), (4.28) and (4.32) into (4.33), we have15:
−4ρpθ2fr + 4ρfθ2f + δ2(y − r + 1)− 4rα2 (4.34)
r∗ =
4ρfθ
2
f + δ
2y + δ2
4ρpθ2f + 4ρfθ
2
f + 4α
2 + δ2
(4.35)
Variable* AsymmetricInformation
ρf ↑ r ↑
ρp ↑ r ↓
δ ↑ r ↑
α ↑ r ↓
8. The Lagrangian with respect to the commission rate indicates that:
−βem − δep
2
+ ρpθ
2
m − ρpθ2my − λ1(ρmθ2my − βem −
δep
2
)− λ3 δ
2
+ λ5β = 0 (4.36)
Substituting equation (4.20), (4.28) and (4.30) into (4.36), we have16:
4ρpθ
2
m − 4ρpθ2my − 4ρmθ2my − δ2(y − r + 1) + 4(1− y)β2 = 0 (4.37)
y∗ =
4ρpθ
2
m + rδ
2 − δ2 + 4β2
4ρpθ2m + 4ρmθ
2
m + δ
2 + 4β2
(4.38)
15The set of restrictions is convex, suggesting a maximum, which is verified using Matlab software.
16The set of restrictions is convex, suggesting a maximum, which is verified using Matlab software.
20
Variable* AsymmetricInformation
ρm ↑ y ↓
ρp ↑ y ↑
β ↑ y ↑
δ ↑ y ↓
21
Appendix 4: Covariance
We need to know the covariance value. According to Lafontaine and Blair (2005):
ρf
2
V ar(franchise′sincome) =
ρf
2
V ar((1− r)θf ) =
ρfθ
2
f
2
(1− r)2 (4.39)
However, the variance definition indicates that:
V ar(X) = E[(X − µ)2] = E(X2)− µ2 (4.40)
X is a random variable with average µ = E(X). Lafontaine and Blair (2005) assumed that
this variation is nearly 0. That is why they set (1− r)2.
The covariance definition indicates:
Cov(XY ) = E[(X − E(X))(Y − E(Y ))] (4.41)
Xand Y are random variables. Following this analogy, we can easily determine the covari-
ance, which could be defined as:
Cov((θm(1− y)), (θfr)) = θfθmr(1− y) (4.42)
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Appendix 5: Case 3
The first-order conditions for the optimization17 the remain identical to those in the case
without the covariance between r and y:
λ1 = 1 (4.43)
λ2 = 1 (4.44)
λ3 =
δ
2
(y − r + 1) (4.45)
λ4 = rα (4.46)
λ5 = β(1− y) (4.47)
1. The Lagrangian with respect to the royalty rate indicates that:
αef +
δep
2
− ρpθ2fr − ρpθfθm(1− y)− λ2(−ρfθ2f + ρfθ2fr + αef +
δep
2
) + λ3
δ
2
− λ4α (4.48)
Substituting equation (4.44), (4.45) and (4.46) into (4.48), we have18:
−4ρpθ2fr − 4ρpθfθm(1− y) + 4ρfθ2f − 4ρfθ2fr + δ2(y − r + 1)− 4rα2 (4.49)
r∗ =
4ρfθ
2
f + δ
2y + δ2 − 4ρpθfθm + 4ρpθfθmy
4ρpθ2f + 4ρfθ
2
f + 4α
2 + δ2
(4.50)
Variable* AsymmetricInformation
ρf ↑ r ↑
ρp ↑ r ↓
δ ↑ r ↑
α ↑ r ↓
y ↑ r ↑
2. The Lagrangian with respect to the commission rate indicates that:
−βem − δep
2
+ ρpθ
2
m − ρpθ2my + ρpθfθmr − λ1(ρmθ2my − βem −
δep
2
)− λ3 δ
2
+ λ5β = 0 (4.51)
17We assume that is sufficiently concave and that are sufficiently convex to ensure that the second-order
conditions hold (Bhattacharyya S. and Lafontaine F., 1995).
18The set of restrictions is convex, suggesting a maximum, which is verified using Matlab software.
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Substituting equation (4.43), (4.45) and (4.47) into (4.51), we have19:
4ρpθ
2
m − 4ρpθ2my − 4ρmθ2my + 4ρpθfθmr − δ2(y − r + 1) + 4(1− y)β2 = 0 (4.52)
y∗ =
4ρpθ
2
m + 4ρpθfθmr + rδ
2 − δ2 + 4β2
4ρpθ2m + 4ρmθ
2
m + δ
2 + 4β2
(4.53)
Variable* AsymmetricInformation
ρm ↑ y ↓
ρp ↑ y ↑
β ↑ y ↑
δ ↑ y ↓
r ↑ y ↑
19The set of restrictions is convex, suggesting a maximum, which is verified using Matlab software.
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